than the material history ofthe actual university.l That is an error, and it is an error endemic to idea discourse. Historically, it is mistaken to think that the university ever had a discrete idea grounding it (even in Kant's oft-mentioned Conflict, the university was the site of contesting and overlapping ideas); it is mistaken to think that it ever existed in a pure state from which it veered off course, especially if you consider the history of the American university (which has a fitful history and started from faithbased rather than nation-or research-based schools); and it is mistaken to think that its current problems pose a unique crisis or fall (the American university, at least since the late nineteenth century, has continually negotiated with business, as Clyde Barrow demonstrates well in Universities and the Capitalist State). We need a sizeable measure of history to leaven the yeast of idea discourse, which has lent an overly airy quality to many of our analyses of the university.
Miller is of course largely following the trajectory that Bill Readings outlined in University in Ruins, which has become something of a touchstone in current discussions of the university. (Just as Miller encapsulated the deconstructive arguments of Paul de Man a generation earlier, Miller promulgated Readings' work after Readings' untimely death.) Part of the reason for the success of Readings' book is that it encapsulated the history of the university in broad strokes and told a simple story: the university was founded on the basis of von Humboldt's idea that it serve the nation-state and Kant's idea that it serve Reason, whereas now, in an era of globalization, it has no similar referent. Instead, it merely represents the vacuous "excellence." As in Miller's account, this process of "dereferentialization" is not a material process but an immaterial one, and Readings finally relies on a metaphysical frame, in fact ofa single Trinity of Kant-von Humboldt-Newman, rather than on the actual history and practice of the university. Given his idealist diagnosis, his only prognosis is for "dissensus-not for, say, more funding-and for reinstalling "Thought" at the center of the university. Readings' account attained a degree of popularity, I think, because it nimbly adapted to the lineage of idea discourse, so it was familiar to literary-minded scholars accustomed to speaking in that language, rather than in the language of history, policy, and funding. 2 Readings and Miller exemplify three tendencies of idea discourse that are misdirected and that we should avoid. First, they resort to a weak idealism-weak because informed as much by rhetorical or narrative as explicit, logical means-that holds that the university derives from the ground of its canonical Ideas. Although Miller uses the qualified phrase "supervising concept," he narrates a dramatic fall from the presence ofthe university's foundational idea to the absence of its current protocol of excellence. Similarly, Readings' diagnosis of"dereferentialization" presupposes an earlier time of stable reference when the idea was present and manifest, and a current time in which the idea has been lost and is absent. It is a story of metaphysical pathos. I suspect that a large part of the attraction of this framing is precisely its metaphysical pathos, which gives it a dramatic form, and idea discourse is often framed in terms of elegyor, even more extremely, apocalyptic narrative. Miller adopts the tone of elegy and the pathos of a world gone, and Readings' very title, "in Ruins," invokes an allegory of the fall, as well as does his diagnosis of a fall into the chaos of dereferentialization. Indeed, much of the current work on the university adopts this tone of dramatic crisis and fall (including my own "Brave New University"). This is not to underestimate the problems facing the university, but the narrative of fallen ideals leans toward a politics of nostalgia, for a time of a unifying concept or full reference that never existed, rather than for pragmatic po licy that leads to the future and adjudicates among the many social interests that the university represents. 3 A related tendency of idea discourse is to treat the history of the university as a history of ideas rather than as the history of actual institutions. Like the history of philosophy, idea discourse gravitates toward key figures and ideas rather than the actual histories of various universities, which provided the contextthat seed those ideas. Moreover, in idea discourse the university tends to be construed as a continuous discursive entity rather than a discontinuous historical entity-as the University rather than universities. Readings constructs his genealogy along signposts of Kant and von Humboldt, and the macro-events of nationalism and globalization, while barely referencing the actual history of the American university (his historical references are sporadic and unsystematic, at points on the French, Italian, or Czech universities). The university encompasses a diverse and heterogeneous set of institutions at anyone time, and one cannot, with any real accuracy, speak of the university as continuous over time. 4 Even if its administrative structure were continuous, insofar as approximately 2 percent of the U.S. population attended university in 1890 and 70 percent have attended some form of college now, the university serves distinctly different social functions and thus instantiates a different kind of idea. It is now a mass institution. 5 A third tendency of idea discourse is that it takes the perspective and represents the interests ofthose who issue it. If one were to ask whose idea jac it expresses, it is largely that of humanists, especially philosophers and literary scholars. (Indeed, there .is a different body of discourse on the university from administrators and from economists, among others.) From Kant's positing the autonomy of philosophy to Readings' "community of dis sensus" and Derrida' s "university without condition," we tend to define the university through our eyes (the title of another Derrida essay is "The University in the Eyes of Its Pupils," which is not about student interests but professorial interests). One can see this tendency in the way that we colloquially name "our work"-not university service, not teaching, but our specific, individual research projects. In turn, we denounce the practices of the university that impede our interests, such as reduced leave time, rather than, say, higher tuition, which in fact impedes the free sphere for students that Newman dreamt of. That is, we tend to register student interests less consequentially than faculty interests, whereas one could easily see student interests as primary, and in fact interpret the autonomy faculty gained in the post -Wor ld War II university as a result of practices like the GI Bill, which infused a precariously funded institution with tuition dollars, as well as remade its image as a public good of the welfare state. 6 The university is not solely ours to prescribe, nor entirely in the provenance of academic practitioners and their interests, nor should it be. Despite how we might sneer at the very mention of legislators, they too claim a certain purchase on representing the public interest.? Like other modern social institutions, one thing that has defined the history of the university has been the continual struggle among the competing interests of the groups comprising it, from students and parents to administrators to legislators, and over the general public vista that they each purport to represent.
Rather than an "idea" that the university derives from, I propose that we think in terms of the various, sometimes conflicting, and often shifting "expectations of the university." I take the term "expectation" from the reception theorist Hans Robert Jauss, who, in "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory," uses it to explain how we interpret and evaluate literary works. We do not understand literary works in media res, solely on their own formal terms and independent merits ("in and of themselves"); rather, we understand them within the set of expectations we gather from literary as well as general history. That set of expectations forms a horizon within which we draw interpretations and make judgments at any given time, but changes over time as it incorporates those interpretations and judgments. With the term "horizon of expectations," Jauss shifts from ahistorical formalism to the historical process of hermeneutics.
The term "expectation" is better than the "idea of the university" because it fuses the conceptual with the historical and frames our assessment of particular forms of the university in the context ofuniversity history and social history. For instance, the form of the university as a clerical institution, to cultivate faith, was once dominant but now seems quaint and holds little force except at a small segment of religious schools (like Brigham Young or Oral Roberst or Notre Dame); our horizon is secular, although it sometimes also includes the otherwise religious expectation of a clerical enclave. "Horizon" foregrounds a sense of historical specificity over the formalist tenor of idea discourse, and also suggests the looming of a future; its stance is forward-looking rather than nostalgic. Idea discourse is oriented toward ontological truth ("the university is/is not. .. "); expectations are oriented not toward validity but toward what is heuristically good or bad ("given its history, we expect. . . "), and represent different constituents with different interests. If we consider the research university, it incorporates multiple interests: faculty who wish support free from control; the state, which wishes the university to produce socially useful research; students who wish for job training; and so on. Like most political negotiations, the issue is not that one group holds the key to the true core of the university, but which interests deserve priority, how to adjudicate among them, and how one might serve all interests justly.
I would distinguish five vistas that inform our current horizon, roughly according with the historical genealogy of the American university. (I focus on the American university because it is the one that wereaders of JAC-inhabit, because it is acknowledged to be the dominant institution in the world today that governs other countries' expectations of the university, and also because it has largely been underattended in the tradition of thinking about the university.) The first is that of a refugium or humanistic enclave. This draws on the legacy of the medieval university, which deliberately built a religious space apart from sometimes fickle feudal power. Its expectation, as I've mentioned, was to sustain religious faith rather than reason. It was dominant through eighteenth and early nineteenth-century American colleges, which were primarily formed under the auspices of Protestant denominations. It receives its most famous articulation in Newman's Idea of a University, which eschews any utilitarian rationale but expands the content of education beyond religion to the more capacious liberal arts. It most accords with the jac Oxbridge model, geared toward small colleges and tutorials, rather than the German model, of a specialized research institute governed by one professor.
The primary interest that it serves is that of students, rather than faculty or state. As Newman remarks, somewhat surprisingly to faculty ears:
If I had to choose between a so-called University, which dispensed with residence and tutorial superintendence, and gave its degrees to any person who passed an examination in a wide range of subjects, and a University which had no professors or examinations at all, but merely brought a number of young men together for three or four years ... if! were asked which of these two methods was the better discipline of the intellect ... the more successful in training, moulding, enlarging the mind, which sent out men the more fitted for their secular duties, which produced better public men, men of the world, men whose names would descend to posterity, I have no hesitation in giving the preference to that University which did nothing. (105) The refugium is certainly still with us, in general in the notoriously useless liberal arts and particularly in elite liberal arts colleges, which are still oriented toward students' well-being and interests. It also holds a significant place in the colloquial image of the ivory tower and in many current discussions of the university, implicitly or explicitly, as I'll talk more about in a moment.
The second vista is that of civic training. This is the Jeffersonian model outlined in "Report of the Commissioners for the University of Virginia" and whose mission is to produce citizens of the republic. In Jefferson's cadence-and I quote this at length because it is rarely elaborated beyond a brief mention in idea discourse-the objects of higher education are To give to every citizen the information he needs for the transaction of his own business ...
To understand his duties to his neighbors and country, and to discharge with competence the functions confided to him by either;
To know his rights; to exercise with order and justice those he retains; to choose with discretion the fiduciary of those he delegates; and to notice their conduct with diligence, with candor, and judgment; And, in general, to observe with intelligence and faithfulness all the social relations under which he shall be placed;
To instruct the mass of our citizens in these, their rights, interests and duties, as men and citizens ... To form the statesmen, legislators and judges, on whom public prosperity and individual happiness are so much to depend;
To expound the principles and structure of government, the laws which regulate the intercourse of nations, those formed municipally for our own government, and a sound spirit of legislation, which, banishing all arbitrary and unnecessary restraint on individual action, shall leave us free to do whatever does not violate the equal rights of another ... And, generally, to form them to habits of reflection and correct action, rendering them examples of virtue to others, and of happiness within themselves. (459-60) In other words, the university is not simply for students to follow their predilections as Newman proposes (although Newman's model assumes that his resulting "gentlemen" would be good citizens), nor to train workers (although Jefferson does also note that such an education should promote "public industry" in "agriculture, manufactures, and commerce"), but for the sake of citizenship. The university directly serves the goals of a democratic society.
This expectation has some resonances with von Humboldt's vision of propagating national culture, but more exactly it accords with the formation of state universities after the Revolution and divorce from British rule. As the historian Russel Nye reports, "Early American colleges were predominantly religious in aim," but in the early nineteenth century there arose a wave of state institutions oriented toward producing not ministers but "useful, intelligent, patriotic citizens" (171, 176) . This abated somewhat when a "wave of evangelistic fervor ... swept over American churches during the first forty years of the nineteenth century," but the republican expectation eventually displaced the sectarian (178).
The interest that this vista represents is the general social good rather than the individual student. Although it does assume individual development, it construes the university not as an isolated refugium but as directly connected to the social fabric. In a sense, it is non-utilitarian insofar as the foremost aim is a general social good rather than job training; on the other hand, it does envision the university as serving a public utility. This civic vista is still with us, though often to very different ends-for instance, in the bombastic nationalism of Cheneyesque pronouncements, which, even if we find them objectionable, assert the public importance of higher education, and, conversely, in the participatory credo of Freire an or other jac kinds of radical pedagogy. The mission statement of every state university in the U.S. propounds this civic expectation.
The third vista is that of vocational training. This is the direction promulgated by late nineteenth-century co liege presidents like Harvard's Charles W. Eliot or Cornell's A.D. White, charging the university to train those who would build new industries, particularly "brain workers" like engineers, and to serve the concordant rise of an American middle class. 8 As Eliot propounded in an 1869 Atlantic Monthly article, extolling the new scientific and technical wings of higher education:
If well organized, with a broad scheme of study, it can convert the boy of fair abilities and intentions into an observant, judicious man, well informed in the sciences which bear upon his profession; so trained, the graduate will rapidly master the principles and details ofany actual works, and he will rise rapidly through the grades of employment; moreover, he will be worth more to his employers from the start than an untrained man. (633) This is a clear departure from Newman's anti-utilitarian credo. While the early American college operated for "the manufacture of ministers," in Nye's words, the vocational model found its most propitious soil in the shift from the religious college to secular, state universities, especially in the late nineteenth century rise ofland-grant universities. They were first seeded by the Morrill Act of 1862, which, through federal land sales, endowed colleges "where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, in such manner as the legislatures of the States may respectively prescribe, in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes" (568). In some sense, this extends the Jeffersonian impetus, but it places most weight uponjob rather than civic training. While it vaguely parallels von Humboldt's prescription for propagating "national culture," it is less exclusive, less rooted in the humanities, more capacious, and more frankly utilitarian. The amalgam of Jeffersonian and land grant models is more decisively formative for and relevant to the specific development of the American university than the so-called German model-and thus more influential to our current horizon.
The interest that the vocational vista serves is broadly social, but it construes the ground of society as industry and economic interests rather than as participatory citizenship in a Jeffersonian public arena. It operates for students, to enhance their economic prospects, and for the world of business, in fact ushering in the industrial rise of the modern U.S. In my surmise, the vocational expectation is still prominent in public mandates, and probably most prominent in student expectations, who, reasonably enough, would like to find suitable employment when they graduate.
The fourth vista is that of disciplinary research. This is the direction forged in the late nineteenth century by educators like Daniel Coit Gilman, who was the founding president of Johns Hopkins (founded as a research institution without undergraduates), and who was trained in and influenced by the German research university. But, contrary to the myth of German origins, only in the post-World War II American university did it reach its fulfillment and become a common expectation. Before World War II, federal funding for research was directed toward independent labs (see Menand) , and universities were suspicious of government ties; only after the war and the hardship of the Great Depression did universities turn to federal sources (see Lowen) . The research vista came to full mass in the 1960s, as Christopher Jencks and David Riesman famously diagnosed in The Academic Revolution, when faculty saw their primary function as research rather than teaching, and their primary loyalty to their professional discipline rather than to their particular schools.
In a sense, the research expectation construes the university as a refugium or enclave, but centered on faculty and their accumulation of disciplinary knowledge rather than students and their learning. It harkens to a version of the monastic, an enclave in which faculty serve their discipline rather than novitiates serving their sect. The interest that it primarily represents, in other words, is that of faculty and their disciplines (which presumably serve a larger altruistic service to human knowledge). In my surmise, much of our current criticism stems not from the diminishment of the Jeffersonian ideal of citizenship but from the shift from faculty to administrative control. Though this seems a precipitous if not draconian shift, it is worth remembering that faculty had little power in the early American college and were subordinate to the dictates of the president and in service to students. The freedom that we associate with research only occurred in large scale in the postwar university and is anomalous in the history of the American university.
The research expectation is obviously still with us, in Research I universities with substantial release time for research as well as in lesser universities that emulate them. The research vista especially inflects faculty expectations of what the university is for.
jac
The fifth vista is usually called corporatization or the corporate university. The conditions for it were created by Vannevar Bush, James Bryant Conant, and others on the National Defense Research Committee, who marshalled the exponential growth of the university after World War II. As part of the massive expansion ofthe welfare state, this model fully integrated the university with the so-called military-industrial complex of the Cold War years and now with the overall corporate complex (not so much rocket science anymore, but "BigPharma," agri-business, and what some people call the health-industrial complex). As R.C. Lewontin explains it, "The radically expanded, higher-educational infrastructure needed after World War II could only have been provided through the socialization of educational costs ... to assume the cost, unbearable even by the largest individual enterprises, of creating new technologies and the trained cadre required both for the implementation of technology that already exists and for creating further innovations" (27, 3). 9 This vista opposes that of the refugium, insofar as it stresses vocational training over leisured exploration for students, and insofar as it stresses research for the sake of corporately definable, useful, and profitable goals over leisured exploration for faculty in the autonomous vineyards of disciplinary knowledge. In some sense, it advances the imperative of the land-grant university, so that the university serves the interests of industry, which in turn presumably serves the interests of our public whole. Though elite liberal arts colleges still largely retain Newman's model, and community and lesser small colleges bluntly aim for job training, the corporate university, by almost all reports, is predominant now. 10 These vistas are of course not entirely separable and in fact meld at most universities, as a reading of the mission statements of any state university will show, which typically cover all bases, from personal exploration to business synergy. Part of the problem of thinking about the university is thatthese expectations frequently existcontradictorially but symbiotically-just as the classics department might have its offices down the hall from the business department. That coexistence lends a certain institutional incoherence, but also a certain flexibility, allowing for otherwise marginal pursuits (like classics) or nascent pursuits (like cultural studies) and accounting for the resilience of the institution. It also induces a certain incoherence, I believe, in our current critiques.
The predominant target of recent criticism has been the corporate university. The university has unapologetically adopted the protocols and bearing of corporations like IBM or GE, and the past thirty years have seen the expansion of administration refashioned in terms of corporate management rather than shared governance, the expectation of corporately sponsored research or directly profitable research through patents, the swift rise of tuition and refashioning of students as "customers," demands for accountability of faculty and the casualization of half the teaching staff, and so on. These changes seem corruptions ofthe idea of the university. They underlie Readings' and Hillis Miller's otherwise wafty objections; the historical context that mandates the idea of"excellence" is the corporate university, which adopted that corporate management buzzword through the 1990s. However, I think thatthere are several problems with the corporate critique, in particular with our understanding of corporatization, with the tacit expectation ofthe university that we hold in its place, and with our imagination of alternative possibilities of the university. By foregrounding the problems ofthe corporate critique, I do not mean to say that, like Dr. Strangelove, we should learn to love corporate life, but that we need to clarify what we are advocating instead.
First, there is a tension, largely unrecognized, in the very definition ofthe university, which is a quintessential corporation. The anti-corporate argument assumes corporatization is exogenous to the university; however, corporatization is in fact indigenous, and the legal standing of corporations is literally inseparable from the history of the U.S. university, beginning with the 1819 Supreme Court decision of The Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward. That case confirmed both the independent status of private colleges and established the case law for corporations, in one famous passage defining corporations with the legal standing of an individual.
The case pitted Jeffersonian Republicans, who were radical democrats and believed in a strong sense of public institutions, against Federalists, who believed in the sanctity of individual rights and private property (more akin to contemporary Republicans). The Republicans had conducted a hostile takeover, wresting Dartmouth away from John Wheelock, the son of the founder Eleazor Wheelock (hence Wheelock Hall at the center of campus), to establish Dartmouth as a state university. Based on the original 1767 charter stipulating Dartmouth as a public corporation, a New Hampshire court had ruled in favor of the Republicans, as Louis Menand explains, reasoning that "if a corporation is established to benefit the public, that corporation is ipso facto a public company, and is therefore subject to public control. It doesn't matter where the money comes from, the court said" (Metaphysical Club 241). The Supreme Court overruled that interpretation. jae Daniel Webster, a Dartmouth alumnus, represented the Trustees (Woodward was a former treasurer who had gone over to the Republican side) and argued that universities were like churches and charities and thus operated independently of the state. Rather, they operated according to the will of their donors. In other words, he appealed to a certain American sensibility-bear in mind that this was not long after the War of 1812 as well as the War oflndependence-of mistrust for governmental interference. He expostulated that
The corporation in question is not a civil, although it is a lay, corporation. It is an eleemosynary corporation. It is a private charity, originally founded and endowed by an individual, with a charter obtained for it at his request, for the better administration of his charity .... Eleemosynary corporations are for the management of private property, according to the will of the donors. They are private corporations. (Hofstadter 205) From this, the legendary Chief Justice Marshall gave us Coca-Cola and Nike, ruling that A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation oflaw. Being the mere creature oflaw, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it. . . . Among the most important are immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality; properties by which a perpetual succession of many persons are considered the same, and may act as a single individual. (Hofstadter 216) Just as a church might continue over time as "one body" without state interference, so too could Dartmouth, and so too could a corporate business. For Marshall, the rights of an individual contract overrode the charter, and in fact he nullified the charter, a vestige of British law, as follows:
The management and application of the funds of this eleemosynary institution, which are placed by the donors in the hands of trustees named in the charter, and empowered to perpetuate themselves, are placed by this act under the control ofthe government of the state. The will ofthe state is substituted for the will of the donors .... This system is totally changed. The charter of 1769 no longer exists ... it is not according to the will of the donors, and is subversive of that contract, on the faith of which their property was given. (219) In other words, the university is the legal and historical model for corporations, not the other way around; historically, corporatization is not an external intrusion visited upon the university, but the form of the university generated the idea ofthe corporation. In Marshall's ruling and subsequent case law, though distinguished as charitable rather than profitable, universities are indelibly a function of private property, existing to serve not the public but the will of the trustees. It is strange to think that, had the 1819 ruling followed the dissent ofJustice Duvall and sustained the strong sense of a charter, there would be no private colleges in the U.S. but all public universities, or for that matter there would be no private corporations but all public ones.
One possibility that this leaves us is that we reassert the distinction between eleemosynary or nonprofit institutions-"of re ligion, of charity, or of education," in Webster's histrionic cadence-and profit-seeking institutions. However, the rub is that this coheres with the post-Reagan evacuation of public programs, so that all welfare, broadly construed, is foisted off on charity rather than on a collective tax base. This is not the most dependable possibility for the university, which thrived under the auspices of the welfare state and the construal of higher education as a public good, meriting public funding. Another possibility-although it's hard to imagine without revolution-is that we reassert the sense of a public charter, even for private corporations, that they be beholden not to the donors or shareholders, but to the social body which grants them their charter to exist. While it seems that the welfare state has been repealed, it has been repealed on the level of social programs but not on the level of what Lewontin calls "the massive socialization" of research and other costs for corporations, as well as militarization. The problem is not that univers ities are corporate, but that the pub lic welfare is construed as being served by the support of private profit-making enterprises.
The second problem with the corporate critique is that it frequently assumes the refugium as the ideal form of the university, but the refugium is mired in its own set of problems. While it projects a prospect outside the operation of commerce, the model of the refugium actually rests on the upward redistribution of wealth and class privilege. It relies largely on patronage-for instance from both Andrew Carnegie and Paul Mellon in the university where I now teach-that is one step removed but, like a thief s tithe of 10 percent, hardly pure nor independent of corporate wealth. Even the more democratic vista of the state university relies on upward redistribution. As Marx observed of the budding American land grant system, "If in some states of the latter country higher educational jac institutions are also' free' that only means in fact defraying the cost ofthe education of the upper [and I would now add professional managerial] classes from the general tax receipts" (539). This is borne out in current statistics that show that those who go to college, even under the auspices of affirmative action, largely come from middle or upperclasses (see Sacks). I would not want entirely to vacate the concept of a space resistant to capitalist forms, but the reality is that the refugium depends on them.
Historically, the refugium is a legacy of upper class exemption from the vagaries of work in early adulthood. It models itself on what Raymond Williams called the "structure of feeling" of a privileged life. One trap, I think, of critiques of labor practices in the university, especially of graduate students, is that they rely on the vista of the refugium, which indeed seems an antidote to the abhorrent practices of casualization. J J The solution, however, is not an exemption from work, but nonexploitive work. Students, like anyone else, should be protected from exploitation, but I do not believe that there is any inherently good reason why they should be exempt from labor or that education should be divorced from other kinds of work. In fact, I think that there are better reasons why they should do other kinds of work. I say this thinking of alternative university models, such as at Antioch or Warren Wilson College, where students have to work a set amount of hours per week in a cooperative-for instance, in food service-to sustain the day-to-day operation of the college, or in Cuba, where students have to work half-time. We need a way to reintegrate work with education, effecting not a privileged refuge but a cooperative that abridges the steppes of privilege.
A related problem of the refugium is that it is almost solely available to young adults. The only extant alternatives are the impoverished ones of "adult education," which might entail BOCES classes at a high school, or the occasional retiree who enrolls at state university. Rather than a youthful hiatus, we might instead think of education as, in another of Raymond Williams' phrases, a "permanent education," integrated with working life and not a privilege of prolonged adolescence of the middle class. An alternative proposal might be that one has a sabbatical from one's job every decade, thus spreading out the four years, threaded through one's working life. This might seem far-fetched, but it is not impossible.
Another quandary of the refugium is that it carries an anti-public or anti-civic bent. It frames the university on a spatial dichotomy, the university constituting an inside and the world (whether state or corporate) an outside. The violation of the corporate university, in this frame, is that it externalizes university space to the world and conversely that it internalizes corporate space to the university. But this dichotomy is untenable, abstractly and historically. Foregoing copious citation of Derrida, I think it's obvious that the inside and outside always bleed over, and the university through its history has continuously negotiated with its diverse outsides. This dichotomy is also undesirable, insofar as it closes the university to its civic role in the Jeffersonian model. The problem is not that the university is open to the world, but that civic or public interest is construed as being served by the corporate world (they beneficently give us jobs and consummable goods). The argument to be made, then, is not that the university should be enclosed, but that corporate goals do not sufficiently serve the public interest.
The third problem with our current critiques is that, while we have strong arguments against corporatization, we tend to present weak positive visions or alternative models. We resort to a nostalgia for the refugium rather than imagine new possibilities. To take one recent example, Stanley Aronowitz's The Knowledge Factory surveys the modem American higher educational system, providing both an innovative sociohistorical account (for instance, explaining the growth of the system as a way to acculturate successive waves of immigration) and issuing a pointed critique (of the stress on training over "true higher learning," as well as of labor and administrative practices). But his solution, presented in the final chapter, is finally a revived humanistic plan not all that far from Cardinal Newman. It essentially reinstitutes a core curriculum-it is a progressive curriculum, encompassing world history and literature as well as familiar Euro-American classics-that would fit the St. John's great books or Columbia humanities-contemporary civilization plan. It is not that this is a bad plan-and, to his credit, Aronowitz puts his money down and works out an alternative-but it is hardly a radical rethinking of the university.
As a point of contrast, Ivan Illich's provocative but now barely read Deschooling Society finds little hope in the formal, institutional educational system we have and thus proposes to abandon it. 12 One suggestion he makes, to counter the dull instrumentality of our current structure and to foster genuine learning in the sense Aronowitz invokes, is the following:
Creative, exploratory learning requires peers currently puzzled about the same terms or problems. Large universities make the futile attempt to match them by multiplying their courses, and they generally fail since they are bound to curriculum, course structure, and bureaucratic administration. In schools, including universities, most resources are spent to purchase the time and motivation ofa limited number of people to take up predetermined problems in a ritually defined setting. The most radical alternative to school would be a network or service which gave each man [or woman] the same opportunity to share his current concern with others motivated by the same concern. (19) While this might seem a utopian proposal befitting the 1960s, and, like the effort to levitate the Pentagon led by Abbie Hoffman in 1968, we would dismiss it as flatly unrealistic, my point is that there is now a relative impoverishment of envisioning what higher education, or simply adult learning, might be, and where and how it might take place.
Given the troubled state ofthe university, there is a march to be stolen in presenting new models or images, alongside pragmatic reforms, to counter the corporate tide. I mean models not in a foundational sense but in a politically heuristic sense, in Kant's terms imperatives rather than ideas, to incite better practices rather than to ascertain truth-for it is images and their prospect for the future that defamiliarize our old horizons of expectation to usher a new horizon, and it is images and the prospect of a future that win hearts and minds.
Notes

Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 1. Other than misidentifying Newman's title, Miller sloppily conflates Newman's idea, which essentially is that of the liberal arts college (as I discuss shortly) and that of the research university, which really did not come into being until late in the nineteenth century in the US, contingent upon not the German university but the conditions of industrial production in the US and the need for the engineering class of that social formation (see Bledstein's Culture of Professionalism). These historical corrections are not merely pedantic but fundamental to understanding the university.
2. Dominick LaCapra's "University in Ruins?" is still the best debunking of Readings' account, especially Readings' paucity of history. I find Readings' account troubled in a few key ways. He assumes that concepts like the nation are referential, but they are just as dereferential or constructed as excellence-to cite the oft-cited phrase, they are imaginary. But more crucially, given the fact that most universities in the U.S. are precisely state universities and subject to state regulations, it is flatly inaccurate to say that the university is now detached from the nation. It might serve a different construal of the nation, but it is not dereferentialized-not the welfare state, but the more militarized, post-welfare state, forming what I've called "the post-welfare state university" rather than the "postnational university" or the "corporate university." The problem is not that the university has lost a ground in the state; rather, it is that the state has been reconfigured from a welfare state to a neoliberal state that offers few social services. See my "The Post-Welfare State University." 3. While Kant appeals to Reason-or, more exactly, philosophy-to adjudicate principles undergirding the disciplines, the actual situation of his Conflict of Faculties shows a much more complicated "idea" of the university. Kant had been censured by King Frederick William II for his questionable religious speculations (see the letter prefacing Conflict), and Kant argues for the autonomy of philosophy from such governmental pressures, but in effect he leaves the structure of the university intact, split between vocational or "higher" faculties, and humanistic or "lower" faculties. That is, he assumed that the university operates in the service ofthe state, and that law and theology were obligated to the state.
4. Addressing recent debates over affirmative action in admissions, Peter Wood remarks that "Before the Bakke decision, when people spoke of'diversity' in education, they almost always meant the variety of colleges and universities in America" (108).
5. To take another example, the predominant continuous thread adverted to in idea discourse is the German research university. But the German system, while influencing nineteenth century American practitioners, is historically specific and not fully applicable. Until relatively recently it was entirely a state system, which accounts for von Humboldt's prescription of its serving national culture, and it was not a popular but elite system, where only about 10 percent of the population attended university. It is also only a part of the story of the development of the American system. As the educational historians James Turner and Paul Bernard show, in an apt corrective of the "myth" of the German origins of the American university, "Yet on closer reading, the tale begins to unravel. To begin with, by no means every university reformer waxed lyrical over Germany .... The story grows still more tattered. German influence accounts clumsily for the changes it is supposed to explain in American higher education between 1850 and 1900" (222-23).
6. On the other hand, the conditions for research, for instance, do not necessarily arise from a purer idea of the university; in the sixties they arose from the overflow of funding related to research for the military-industrial complex, as many protests atthe time pointed out. My larger point is that different practices further different interests, so while one particular idea is a good from one perspective, it might have contradictory effects in practice.
7. In "Brave New University," I argue for attention to popular representations of the university, in the many novels, films, as well as news reports,
